

Gp 17 - CARPETAS -

VARIOS: REINO UNIDO: DEFENSA

BIOGRAFIA: BRIGADIER GRAL
JOHN F. STEWART. -
Director Icia (I-2). -

ENTRENAMIENTO: Piedra fundamental
del estado de preparación
y clave para la victoria. -

ENTRENAMIENTO y Educación para los Líderes
del Futuro. - ECAD y EMEF EEUU. -

INGLATERRA: Apreciación británica. - de las
FFAA Argentinas. -

VELOZ



Inv N. 926
B. 05. 84

REINO UNIDO

DEFENSA:

Como Soberana, la Reina es el Comandante en Jefe nominal de las FFAA. En realidad, el control se ejerce a través del Gobierno de turno mediante el Primer Ministro y el Ministro de Defensa que, en GRAN BRETAÑA, se llama Secretario de Estado de Defensa. La doctrina de responsabilidad colectiva implica que otros miembros del Gabinete están involucrados en el proceso de toma de decisiones.

Dentro del Gabinete, un Comité de Política Exterior y de Defensa (en el cual se encuentran el Primer Ministro, el Secretario de Estado de Defensa, el Canciller, el Secretario de Estado sobre Asuntos Exteriores, el Secretario del Interior y otros designados por el Primer Ministro) es el principal cuerpo que analiza los asuntos de defensa del ejército. El Secretario de Estado de Defensa es responsable de informar al Parlamento. También es responsable de administrar las FFAA a través del control del Ministro de Defensa.

El Ministerio de Defensa se reorganizó para mejorar la formulación de políticas y aumentar el control sobre el presupuesto de Defensa, mientras delega responsabilidades por la conducción diaria de las Fuerzas y de la Dirección de Compras.

La nueva estructura incluye un Estado Mayor de Defensa civil/militar unificado que se ocupa de la estrategia y la política de defensa; de los compromisos y requerimientos operacionales; se subordina al Jefe de Estado Mayor de Defensa y al Subsecretario Permanente a través del Subjefe de Estado Mayor de Defensa. Existe también una oficina de Administración y Presupuesto, que depende del Subsecretario Permanente, y se ocupa del control presupuestario y la administración de recursos.

Los Jefes de Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas se subordinan a través del Jefe de Estado Mayor de Defensa al Secretario de Estado en todo lo concerniente a la efectividad de combate, la administración, la efectividad y el espíritu de la fuerza. La administración de las tres fuerzas se ejerce a través de comités ejecutivos de las Juntas de las Fuerzas, que son presididas por los respectivos Jefes de Estado Mayor y operan de acuerdo con objetivos y presupuestos determinados de manera centralizada.

La dirección de compras está encabezada por el Jefe de Compras de Defensa y se creó un nuevo puesto de Colaboración en Equipos de Defensa a fin de fomentar las compras conjuntas entre naciones aliadas y amigas.

Las fuerzas británicas se caracterizan por una gran integración y centralización. Las funciones multi-fuerza, como por ejemplo las logísticas son desarrolladas por organismos especiales que actúan en nombre de las fuerzas.

Total de Efectivos de las FFAA: 323.500


Fuerzas Paramilitares: No tiene

Reservas: 305.000

Período de Servicio Militar: No. Fuerza Voluntaria

Gastos Militares Anuales: u\$s 30.500 millones

Alianzas y Organizaciones: Commonwealth, Plan Colombo, Consejo de Europa, Comunidad Económica Europea (EEC), Agencia de Energía Atómica Internacional, (IAEA), Organización de Aviación Civil Internacional (ICAO), Comité del Fondo Marino, Acuerdo General de Tarifas y Comercio, otros.



Cutaway drawing of the modernized M-44 SP howitzer for the Turkish Army. The conversion programme is underway with German industrial assistance.

Roman and modern continental influences in judicial review of Acts of Parliament. Branches of government: Legislative authority resides in Parliament; executive authority with collectively responsible cabinet led by Prime Minister; House of Lords is supreme judicial authority and highest court of appeal. Suffrage: Universal over age 18.

Economic

GNP: \$441 billion (1985); \$7,900 per capita. Balance of trade: Imports, \$109.1 billion (c.i.f., 1985); exports, \$101 billion (c.a.f., 1985). Budget: Revenues, \$222.3 billion; expenditure, \$232.2 billion (FY 86 est.).

Defence

Structure:

As Sovereign, the Queen is the nominal Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Actual control is exercised through the Government of the day via the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence who, in Britain, is known as the Secretary of State for Defence. The doctrine of collective responsibility means that other Cabinet members are deeply involved in the decision-making process.

Within the Cabinet, a Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, on which sit the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Home Secretary and any others appointed by the Prime Minister, is the prime body for considering the country's defence affairs. The Secretary of State for Defence is responsible for reporting to Parliament. He is also responsible for the administration of the armed forces through his control of the Ministry of Defence.

The Ministry of Defence has been reorganised to improve policy formulation and to tighten control over the defence budget, while devolving responsibility for day-to-day management of the Services and the Procurement Executive.

The new structure contains a unified military/civilian Defence Staff responsible for defence policy and strategy, operational requirements and commitments; it reports to the Chief of Defence Staff and the Permanent Under-Secretary through a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff. An Office of Management and Budget, reporting to the Permanent Under-Secretary, is concerned with budgetary control and resource management. Each Service Chief of Staff reports through the Chief of Defence Staff to the Secretary of State on matters relating to the fighting effectiveness, management, overall efficiency and morale of his Service. The management of the three Services is exercised through executive committees of the Service Boards, which are chaired by their respective Chiefs of Staff, and act in

Air Force Battle Order

Manpower: 57,400 (includes 36,000 conscripts). Reserves: 70,000.

Conscript service period: 18 months.

Equipment:

Fighter/ground attack: 80 F-4E PHANTOMS, 40 F-100C/D/F SUPER SABRES, 82 F-5A/Bs. Interceptors: 145 F-104G STARFIGHTERS, 36 F-104S STARFIGHTERS.

Reconnaissance: 7 RF-4E PHANTOMS, 27 RF-5As.

Transport: 7 C-130E HERCULES, 20 C-160D TRANSALLs, 40 C-47s, 3 C-54s, 3 Cessna 421s.

Training: 29 T-38 TALONS, 20 T-37s, 60 T-33s, 12 T-34s, 20 T-41s, 5 T-42s, 16 TF-104Gs.

Electronic Countermeasures: 4 Bell UH-1Hs.

Search and Rescue: 5 SH-19s, 25 UH-1Hs.

Survey: 2 B-N ISLANDERS.

Utility: 32 UH-1D/Hs.

VIP: 2 Cessna CITATION IIs.

AAM: SIDEWINDER, SUPER SIDEWINDER, SPARROW, FALCON, SHAFRIR.

ASM: AS-12, BULLPUP, MAVERICKS.

SAM: 72 NIKE HERCULES (8 squadrons), 36 RAPIERs (two squadrons).

NB: On order: 160 F-16C/Ds (first 4 F-16Ds delivered at end-1987, first Turkish-built F-16C undergoing flight testing), 36 RAPIER fire units, 40 additional UH-1Hs (for SAR and ECM), 6 AH-1S COBRAS, SUPER SIDEWINDER, SPARROW AAM. The TAF has been acquiring ex-NATO F-100s and F-104Gs, the most recent acquisition being 50 ex-CAF CF-104s (30 of these will be refurbished and put into service, while the remaining 20 will be "cannibalised" for spares). Turkey could procure 40 strike aircraft (TORNADO or MIRAGE 2000). Replacement of the ageing C-47s with a modern transport aircraft is planned.

UNITED KINGDOM

General

Area: 244,046 sq km (152,568 square miles); 30% arable, 50% meadow and pasture, 12% waste or urban, 7% forested, 1% inland water.

Coastline: 12,429 km (7,732 miles).

Territorial waters claimed: 5.5 km (3 nautical miles); fishing 367 km (200 nautical miles).

Major cities: London (capital: 6.8 million); Birmingham (1.01 million); Glasgow (744,000); Liverpool (561,000); Manchester (515,999); Leeds (712,200); Sheffield (540,500).

Population: 56,845,000; average annual growth rate 0.15%. Of this 81% is English, 9% Scottish, 5% Welsh, 3% Irish, 2% other ethnic immigrants.

Religions: 27 million are Church of England, 5.3 million Roman Catholic, 2 million Presbyterians, 760,000 Methodists, 450,000 Jews, and other ethnic religions.

Language: English, Welsh (about 26% of population of Wales); Scots Gaelic (about 100,000 in Scotland).

Literacy rate: 99%.

Political

Country's legal name: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Type of government: Constitutional monarchy.

Political subdivisions: 650 parliamentary constituencies.

Legal system: Common law tradition with early

THE INTELLIGENT SOLUTION SPECTRONIC DENMARK

Considerable experience and know-how in the counterintelligence and surveillance field has enabled our dynamic electronic staff to develop and produce specialised products, which are highly appreciated in the electronic communication world.

SPECTRONIC DENMARK

P.O. Box 63 - DK 8500 Grenaa - Denmark
Phone 45 6 32 22 80 - Fax 45 6 32 32 10
Telex 60 320



DEX 017
professional integrated portable countermeasures system. 100Khz. - 2200 Ghz.



SP PRG 005
Stationary random noise generator.



SP GS TLC 021
Portable telephone surveillance unit.

SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

(Government service line).

- Micro surface acoustic wave controlled transmitters (SAW).
- Micro crystal controlled transmitters.
- High sensitive receiving systems.
- TX/RX equipment in the HF-VHF-UHF frequency spectrum.
- Multi channel radiosystems.
- Portable induction communication systems for guards.

COUNTER SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT


- Professional portable countermeasures systems (ECCM).
- Counterequipment against laser monitoring systems.
- Scrambling and encryption equipment.
- Portable pseudo random noise jamming systems.
- Full band portable jamming equipment 1350 Mhz.
- Multifrequency audio sweep generator.
- Protection equipment for computer surveillance.
- International sweeping service.

CUSTOM DESIGN EQUIPMENT AND SOLUTIONS

- Extremely low noise wide band RF amplifiers.
- Low noise high gain audio/video amplifiers.

United Kingdom

The GR.5 HARRIER II is now entering service with the RAF to re-equip the GR.3 squadrons in West Germany. A total of 62 GR.5s are on order.



6 units in infantry rôle
2 Army Air Corps squadrons
9 battalions of the Ulster Defence Regiment

Overseas Deployment:

British Army of the Rhine (56,000):

1 Corps Headquarters

1 artillery brigade

3 armoured divisions

Berlin Infantry Brigade (with 3,000 men)

BAOR has a current peacetime strength of 56,000 but would be expanded to a total force of about 140,000 on mobilisation. It comprises a strong fighting formation — 1 (BR) Corps, together with logistic support. 1 (BR) Corps itself consists of four divisions: three armoured divisions are located permanently in the Federal Republic, while the 2nd Infantry Division is based in the United Kingdom in peacetime and would deploy to the Federal Republic in a period of tension.

Together with corps from Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1 (BR) Corps forms part of NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) which is responsible for the defence of Northern Germany roughly from the Ruhr to the coast. Within that area, 1 (BR) Corps is responsible for a 65 km stretch of front. The Commander-in-Chief of BAOR also has the NATO appointment of Commander of the Northern Army Group (COMNORTHAG). NORTHAG's plans and concepts have recently been revised and new developments must obviously be matched by the right equipment. The

accordance with centrally determined policy objectives and budgets.

The Procurement Executive is headed by the Chief of Defence Procurement and a new post of Chief of Defence Equipment Collaboration has been established to promote collaborative procurement with allies and friendly nations.

Britain's forces are integrated to a high degree, due to increased centralisation. Multi-service functions, such as logistics, are the responsibility of a number of special agencies acting on behalf of the services.

Total armed forces: 323,500.

Para-military forces: None.

Reserves: 305,000

Conscript service period: Nil. Voluntary force.

Annual military expenditure: \$30.5 billion (1987/8).

Alliances and organisations: Commonwealth, Colombo Plan, Council of Europe, EEC, OEA, ICAO, NATO, Seabeds Committee, UN, ADB, GATT and others.

47 infantry battalions

4 Gurkha infantry battalions

3 parachute battalions

1 LANCE SSM Regiment

3 air defence regiments with RAPIER SAM

1 Special Air Service regiment

18 artillery regiments

12 engineer regiments (1 Gurkha)

4 army aviation regiments

70% of the regular and reserve army is assigned to SACEUR, with the greater part of the remainder being committed to the home defence of the UK.

UK element of Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) - AML:


UK Mobile Force (UKMF)

Special Air Service Regiment

HQ Northern Ireland:

2 infantry brigade HQs

1 engineer squadron



Army Battle Order

Manpower: 162,000.

Reserves: 152,700 (regular), 76,100 (Territorial Army), 6,500 (Ulster Defence Regiment).

Conscript service period: Nil. Voluntary force.

Organisation:

1 armoured and 1 infantry division, 1 field force

1 armoured regiments (battalions)

1 armoured reconnaissance regiments

Introduction of the DROPS palletized delivery system (shown here on Foden truck) is now underway, and will mark a considerable improvement to the British Army's logistic structure.

We produce every kind of electric-power systems.



AWG

D 9928

Adolf Witte GmbH

Revensberg 8 - 2203 Gertorf

Telefon: 043 48/68 77 - 94 78

Telex: 29 2517 witte d



The Vickers/Verolme AS90 is one of the three contenders in the competition for a new 155 mm SP gun/howitzer, to be selected soon to replace the ill-fated SP-70 programme.

CHALLENGER tank and WARRIOR (MCV 80) armoured personnel carrier enable armoured brigades to achieve the degree of protected mobility required under the new concept. But battlefield mobility can only be achieved if the troops can counter enemy artillery and air attack. It is planned to improve the fire-power, range, co-ordination, accuracy and survivability of 1 (BR) Corps' artillery support; and three new systems, the Multiple-Launch Rocket System, the PHOENIX remotely-piloted vehicle, and the artillery ADP system BATES are being developed for introduction in the early 1990s. It is also intended to form a new air defence regiment; the introduction of tracked RAPIER into BAOR is improving the mobility of area air defence.

Territorial Army enhancements will soon greatly improve the ability to reinforce BAOR. Three of the six new infantry battalions being raised have NATO rôles, as do five new JAVELIN-equipped air defence batteries, a new armoured reconnaissance squadron, two Special Air Service squadrons, and improved medical support. BAOR's other logistic services will be strengthened with additional ordnance units and workshops. The trial of raising Territorial Army units on the Continent is going well: an ambulance-train staff and a transport squadron have been fully recruited, and three other sub-units are being formed.

Cyprus (3,200):

1 armoured reconnaissance squadron
1 engineer support squadron
1.5 infantry battalions
1 flight Army Air Corps

Gibraltar (770):

1 infantry battalion
Royal Engineer elements
1 surveillance troop of the Royal Artillery

Belize (1,300):

1 armoured reconnaissance troop
1 field artillery battery
1 engineer squadron
1 infantry battalion
1 flight Army Air Corps

Brunei:

1 Gurkha infantry battalion
1 flight Army Air Corps

Hong Kong (1,964):

1 Gurkha Engineer Regiment
1 UK infantry battalion
3 Gurkha infantry battalions
1 Army Air Corps helicopter squadron

Falklands (1,500 men):

1 infantry battalion group
RA and RE elements
1 AD battery

Supporting arms and services

Sinai:

MFO detachment

Canada:

1 training unit

Equipment:

Tanks: 250 CHALLENGERS, 900 CHIEFTAINS

Armoured reconnaissance: 314 SCIMITARS, 271 SCORPIONS, 200 FOX, 1,070 FERRETS

MICVs: some 100 WARRIORS

APCs and AFVs: 12 SALADINS, 60 SARACENS, 525 SPARTANS (+25 TA), 258 SULTANS (+25 TA), 50 SAMARITANS, 86 SAMPSONS (+2 TA), 500 SAXONS

Artillery: 150 105 mm (light), 79 FH-70 155 mm towed how, 120 FV433 ABBOT 105 mm, 100 M-109 155 mm, 36 M-107 175 mm, 16 M-110 203 mm SP guns/how.

RCLs: 84 mm CARL GUSTAV

SSMs: 12 LANCE

ATGWs: 87 STRIKERS (SWINGFIRE), MILAN


SAMs: 108 RAPIER, BLINDFIRE, JAVELIN
Army Aviation: 80 SCOUTS, 8 ALOUETTE IIs, 187 GAZELLES, 10 BEAVERS, 22 CHIPMUNKS, 123 LYNX, 4 A-109s

NB: Equipment on order includes 201 CHALLENGER tanks, some 950 WARRIOR MICVs, LAW-80 RLs, TOW ATGWs, and 57 227 mm MLRS. The following developments in Army procurement are scheduled to take place:

CHIEFTAIN replacement: Deliveries are underway of the new main battle tank CHALLENGER, now in service. A rush programme for CHALLENGER 2 is currently underway.

CHIEFTAIN: An improved armour-piercing round for the tank is under development which, together with improvements in fire-control, will enhance CHIEFTAIN's effectiveness. The CHIEFTAINS deployed with the BAOR are being retrofitted with composite armour plates to the turret.

HMS CAMPBELTOWN, third Type 23/Batch 3 frigate, at launch at Cammell Laird shipyard.



Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles: Mid-life improvements to both wheeled and tracked variants are under consideration.

TOW: This anti-tank guided weapon has been fitted to the LYNX. Missiles are being produced in the United States and the helicopter fitment is being manufactured under licence in the United Kingdom.

SWINGFIRE Anti-Tank Guided Weapon: The combined day/night sight to enhance SWINGFIRE's capability has been introduced.

MILAN Anti-Tank Guided Weapon: MILAN is in service in BAOR. The night sight for MILAN has been deployed and is being adopted by the UK, France and Germany.

Future Anti-Tank Guided Weapons: Discussions with France and the Federal Republic of Germany have led to the formulation of the tripartite staff target for future systems. A programme (TRIGAT) is now underway for the development of new ATGW systems.

Light Anti-Armour Weapon: The LAW-80 man-portable anti-armour weapon to replace the CARL GUSTAV and M 72 rocket is now in the production phase and due to be fielded in British service soon.

Mines: Add-on fuzes have been developed to improve the barmine's resistance to counter-measures and the scope of its operational effectiveness.

Multiple Launch Rocket System: The UK, US, France, West Germany and Italy, have signed a memorandum of understanding for co-operative procurement of the MLRS. The British Army will receive its first units in the late 1980s.

Target Acquisition and Surveillance: Studies are continuing on a system to replace current short-range surveillance and target acquisition systems in the 1990s. A prototype of PHOENIX, a battlefield surveillance and target acquisition system based on an unmanned remotely piloted vehicle, has been flown.

Small Arms: The British SA80 weapons are now entering service with British forces.

Unit Air Defence: Development has begun on further improvements to the RAPIER system. Work has started on modifications to improve the performance of JAVELIN.

Army Communications: The PTARMIGAN, tactical trunk communications system has been installed throughout 1 (BR) Corps.

Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Systems: WAVELL issues have commenced and the systems will be complete by 1988. Procurement will start on a Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System (BATES), which would assist the Army in making the optimum use of artillery resources in the 1990s.

Electronic Warfare: In many fields of warfare increasing significance is attached to the use of electronic techniques, both defensively and offensively. Today's highly complex weapons and their associated surveillance tracking and targeting systems are vulnerable to ECM, which seek, for example, to confuse opposing radars or to distract incoming missiles. In turn, it is possible to introduce features into weapon systems which reduce their vulnerability to ECM. The Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union in particular, have invested heavily in such equipment as a complement to more traditional weaponry. Measures currently in hand to improve the United Kingdom's own EW capability include several programmes. New equipment is being deployed this year with EW units which form part of 1 (BR) Corps. Studies have also begun on the equipment with which these units will be supplied in the 1990s.

Naval Battle Order

Manpower: 68,200 (including 7,600 Royal Marines and 3,400 Women's Royal Naval Service).
Reserves: 26,200 regular, 6,300 volunteers.
Conscript service period: Nil. Volunteer force.

Organisation: Royal Navy units deployed outside NATO: West Indies (frigates); Falkland Islands; Hong Kong (patrol craft, Marine raiding squadron); Diego Garcia (Naval party, Marine detachment); Antarctica (ice patrol ship); In-

dian Ocean (two ships, auxiliary); the Gulf (Armillia Patrol).

NB: The Royal Marine Commando Forces consist of a brigade headquarters and three commando groups with logistic and helicopter support. Two commando groups and a tactical brigade headquarters are fully equipped and trained for mountain and arctic warfare.

The Commando force is supported by two naval helicopter squadrons; both are trained and equipped for Arctic operations.

Fleet:

ASW Carriers:

3 INVINCIBLE class

Guided Missile Destroyers:

12 Type 42 SHEFFIELD class

1 Type 82 BRISTOL class

Frigates:

6 Type 21 AMAZON class

7 Type 22 BROADSWORD class

23 LEANDER class (different armament configuration)

Submarines:

4 RESOLUTION class SSBNs (These constitute the UK's strategic forces with 16 POLARIS strategic missiles each, 1 on standby/refit)

2 VALIANT class fleet vessels, nuclear powered

6 SWIFTSURE class (2 on standby/refit)

3 CHURCHILL class

4 TRAFALGAR class

13 OBERON class patrol type

Amphibious warfare ships:

2 FEARLESS class LPDs

Helicopter support/training ship:

1 ENGADINE class

Mine warfare forces:

11 HUNT class MSM/EDATS type

2 ex-commercial stern trawlers

1 prototype glass-reinforced plastic minehunter

14 TON class minehunters (2 on standby/refit)

8 TON class minesweepers (1 on standby/refit)

12 RIVER class minehunters

1 ABDIEL class MCM support ship

Light forces:

2 CASTLE class offshore patrol vessels

7 ISLAND class offshore patrol vessels

5 BIRD class large patrol craft (1 on standby/refit)

15 coastal training craft

2 coastal patrol craft

5 PEACOCK class patrol craft

3 Falkland Islands patrol vessels

Miscellaneous vessels include a maintenance ship (1), submarine support ship (1), inshore survey craft, ice patrol ship (1), fleet tenders (4), helicopter support ship (1), a diving ship, and a Royal Yacht/hospital ship.



In addition to the regular Royal Navy there is a large Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service. This includes: fleet tankers large (4), fleet tankers small (5), fleet tankers support (5), fleet replenishment ships (4), LSL (6), 1 aviation training ship, 1 air stores support ship, mooring, salvage and boom vessels, coastal tankers, trials ships, torpedo recovery vessels, cable ships, experimental ships, a target ship, armament carriers, water carriers, ocean tugs, fleet tenders, tank cleaning vessels, degaussing vessels, nuclear decontamination vessels and a Scottish Fishery Protection vessel.

NB: The above are vessels in service. There are at least 50 vessels either in reserve, undergoing long refit conversion, etc. The following relates to current equipment programmes.

The first and second TRIDENT submarines have been ordered. Four TRIDENT submarines will replace the POLARIS submarines in the 1990s.

The fifth TRAFALGAR boat, HMS TRENCANT, was launched in 1986. The sixth and seventh are under construction.

The first Type 2400 conventional submarine, HMS UPHOLDER, to replace the ageing OBERON class, has been launched. Three further



Their capabilities depend on ours.

VSEL

Vickers Shipbuilding
& Engineering Limited

Some of the world's most sophisticated defence requirements are satisfied by VSEL. From nuclear powered submarines and the latest capital ships

to advanced artillery systems.

The extremely high standards we set ourselves as a company are reflected in the capabilities of all our products.

Barrow-in-Furness
Cumbria LA14 1AF England
Telephone 0229 23366
Telex 65411 VSEL G
Facsimile 0229 23366

• United Kingdom

submarines of this type have been ordered. Seven additional Type 22 frigates (3 "Batch II" and four "Batch III") have been ordered. The first three Type 23 frigates (DUKE class) have been ordered and the first launched.

All LEANDER class modernisations not already begun have been cancelled. As a result, these ships are being retired as they reach their scheduled period for long refit, or they are being sold off.

The EH 101 successor to the SEA KING helicopter is in prototype flight testing; it is hoped that this will form the first element of a broader European helicopter package. The deployment of the LYNX helicopter to destroyers and frigates continues.

New sonars are being developed and fitted to improve the capabilities of ships, submarines and helicopters to detect and classify submarines.

Naval aviation:

3 fighter squadrons: 2 with 10 FRS-1 SEA HARRIERS; 1 with 8 S-1/T-4 SEA HARRIERS and 3 HUNTER T-SMs for pilot training

7 ASW helicopter squadrons with 60 HAS-2/-5 SEA KINGS

1 ASW/ASVW helicopter squadron with 12 HAS-2 LYNXs and 5 HAS-1 WASP; 40 embarked flights with HAS-2 LYNX and HAS-1 WASP

3 commando assault squadrons with HU-4 SEA KINGS

1 AEW helicopter squadron with 8 AEW-2 SEA KINGS

1 aircrew training squadrons; 1 with 16 T-2/-3 JETSREAMS; 1 with 19 HT-2 GAZELLES, training flight with 10 T-10 CHIPMUNKS

2 Fleet Support and SAR squadrons with 10 HU-5 WESSEXs

1 Fleet Training and Support unit with 2 CANBERRAs and 13 HUNTERS

2 flights with 3 C-2 SEA HERONS and 1 C-20 SEA DEVON

ASM: SEA EAGLE, SEA SKUA

NB: SEA EAGLE is entering service to equip SEA HARRIERS, BUCCANEERS and possibly TORNADO GR.1s as well. The SEA HARRIERS are to be updated to the FRS.2 configuration.

Royal Marines:

1 commando brigade HQ

3 commando units

1 artillery regiment

1 volunteer artillery battery

2 engineer squadrons (1 volunteer)

1 light helicopter squadron

1 logistics regiment

1 Special Boat Squadron assault squadrons

Major naval bases: Cudrose, Devonport, Falmouth, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Lee-on-Solent, Portland, Portsmouth, Rosyth, Yeovilton.

Royal Air Force Battle Order

Manpower: 93,400.

Reserves: 36,000.

Volunteer Reserve: 1,300.

Organisation and Deployment:

Strike/Attack:

TORNADO GR.1 — 9 squadrons (7 in RAF Germany)

BUCCANEERS — 2 squadrons (optimised for attack of maritime targets)

JAGUAR — 2 squadrons

Offensive Support:

HARRIER GR.3 — 3 squadrons (2 in RAF Germany)

Maritime Patrol:

NIMROD MR — 4 squadrons

Reconnaissance:

JAGUAR — 2 squadrons (1 in RAF Germany)

CANBERRA PR9 — 1 special flight

NIMROD — 1 squadron

Air Defence:

LIGHTNING F3/F6 — 1 squadron

PHANTOM FGR1/2/F4J — 7 squadrons (2 in

RAF Germany)

HAWK (war rôle) — 6 squadrons armed with AIM 9L/cannon

TORNADO F3 — 1 squadron (2nd forming)

Transport (Long/Medium Range):

C-130 HERCULES — 4 squadrons

VC 10 1 Squadron

AEW:

SHACKLETON — 1 squadron

Tankers:

VICTOR K2 — 1 squadron

VC 10 K — 1 squadron

TRISTAR — 1 squadron

Tactical Helicopter Transport:

WESSEX Mk2 — 2 squadrons

PUMA — 2 squadrons (1 in RAF Germany)

CHINOOK — 2 squadrons (1 in RAF Germany)

SAR:

WESSEX SAR — 1 squadron

SEA KING — 1 squadron

Communications:

3 squadrons, (1 squadron in RAF Germany)

with a mix of ANDOVER, BAe 146, HS 125,

PEMBROKE, and GAZELLE aircraft

Operational Conversion Units:

Equipped for their particular rôles with JAGUAR, TORNADO, PHANTOM, BUCCANEER, HARRIER, PUMA, SEA KING, CHINOOK, NIMROD and HERCULES aircraft.

Tactical Weapons Units:

HAWK and TORNADO aircraft

Training:

CHIPMUNK, BULLDOG, JET PROVOST,

HAWK, HS 125, JETSTREAM, GAZELLE

and WESSEX aircraft

ECM Training:

CANBERRA — 1 Squadron

Missiles:

SAM: BLOODHOUND, RAPIER

AAM: RED TOP, SPARROW, SKYFLASH,

AIM 9 (SIDEWINDER)

ASM: MARTEL, HARPOON, SEA EAGLE

Ground Defence:

RAF Regiment — 5 armoured squadrons (38

SCORPIONS, 19 SCIMITARS, 113 SPARTANs,

7 SULTANS), 9 SAM squadrons

(RAPIER).


Future Plans:

TORNADO: Reconnaissance version due to enter service late 80s to replace JAGUAR.

AEW: The decision to procure six Boeing E-3s

with an option for two more, was made over

NIMROD AEW in December 1986.



The Royal Air Force is procuring 130 Embraer/Shorts TUCANO trainers to replace its JET PROVOST fleet.

Tankers: Conversion of further VC 10s to the tanker rôle is planned and the modification of TRISTAR aircraft from transport to tanker rôles continues.

AAM: SKYFLASH and SIDEWINDER will be carried initially by TORNADO ADV. AMRAAM and ASRAAM will supersede them.

HARRIER: 62 HARRIER GR.5 aircraft have been ordered, mainly to re-equip the GR.3 squadrons in RAF Germany.

EFA: The EUROFIGHTER project continues into the project definition stage as a collaborative venture pursued by the Federal German Republic, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The aircraft is due to enter Royal Air Force service in the mid-90s to replace PHANTOM and JAGUAR assets.

JP 233: Delivery of JP 233 advance airfield attack/denial weapon to TORNADO squadrons continues.

Anti-Radar: ALARM has been ordered as the Royal Air Force's principal anti-radar weapon. Ground Attack: A requirement for a long range stand-off missile for the Tornado GR.1 is being studied.

and other ground-attack weapons. The missile would probably be carried by the Tornado GR.1.

number of "small" missiles. The Royal Air Force is studying the possibility of carrying a number of "small" missiles.

UK Air Force is studying the possibility of carrying a number of "small" missiles. The Royal Air Force is studying the possibility of carrying a number of "small" missiles.

(UKADGE) is being studied. The Royal Air Force is studying the possibility of carrying a number of "small" missiles.

with the best of the world's radar. The Royal Air Force is studying the possibility of carrying a number of "small" missiles.

handling and processing. The Royal Air Force is studying the possibility of carrying a number of "small" missiles.

radar equipment is being studied. The Royal Air Force is studying the possibility of carrying a number of "small" missiles.

passive defence and active defence. The Royal Air Force is studying the possibility of carrying a number of "small" missiles.

NIMROD Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) Aircraft: The first batch of NIMROD MR aircraft is to be refitted under a programme to enhance their detection and classification capability against submarines and surface ships re-entered service.

Training Aircraft: 130 TUCANO training aircraft have been ordered to replace the JET PROVOST fleet.

Numbers of Aircraft: The exact number of aircraft of each type in the Royal Air Force in-

Inventory is classified information. However, a squadron normally has 12 to 16 aircraft, except for those operating large aircraft (such as C-130), when the number is normally 8 to 10.

Major Air Bases: Abingdon, Alconbury (US), Aldergrove, Binbrook, Brawdy, Boscombe Down, Brize Norton, Chivenor, Church Fenton, Coltishall, Coningsby, Cottesmore, Cranwell, Farnborough, Finningley, Honington, Kinloss, Lakenheath (US), Leeming, Leuchars, Linton-on-Ouse, Lossiemouth, Lyneham, Manston, Marham, Mildenhall (US), Northolt, Odiham, St Athan, St Mawgan, Scampton, Shawbury, Swindon, Tern Hill, Upper Heyford (US), Valley, Waddington, Wattisham, West Wittering, Wyton.

YUGOSLAVIA

General

Area: 255,804 sq km (98,776 square miles); 32% arable, 25% meadows and pastures, 34% forested, 9% other. **Bosnia and Herzegovina** 51,129 sq km (19,741 miles), **Croatia** 56,538 sq km (21,829 sq miles), **Macedonia** 25,713 sq km (9,928 sq miles), **Montenegro** 13,812 sq km (5,333 sq miles), **Serbia** 88,361 sq km (34,116 sq miles including Province of Kosovo and Vojvodina), **Slovenia** 20,251 sq km (7,819 sq miles).

Coastline: 1,521 km (945 miles) mainland, plus 2,414 km (1,500 miles) offshore islands.

Territorial waters claimed: 22 km (12 nautical miles) extended from 10 nautical miles in February, 1979; fishing 22 km (12 nautical miles).

Major cities: Belgrade (1,209,360); Zagreb (602,000); Skopje (388,966); Sarajevo (243,980); Novi Sad (213,861); Ljubljana (192,000); Nis (193,509); Split (185,000); Maribor (172,000); Rijeka (160,000).

Population: 23,430,800 (July 1987); average annual growth rate 0.66%. The population is made up of 37.9% Serbs, 22.1% Croats, 8.4% Muslims, 8.2% Slovenes, 5.8% Macedonian, 2.5% Montenegrin, 8.2% Albanians, 2.3% Hungarians, 4.6% other.

Religions: 41% Serbian or Macedonian Orthodox, 32% Roman Catholic, 16% Muslim, 3% other, 8% no adherence.

Languages: Serbo-Croatian, Slovene, Macedonian are the official languages; Albanian, Hungarian and Italian also spoken.

Literacy rate: 90%.

Political

Country's legal name: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Type of government: Communist state, federal republic in form.

Political subdivisions: 6 republics with 2 autonomous provinces (within the Republic of Serbia).

Legal system: Mixture of civil law system and Communist legal theory; constitution adopted in 1974.

Branches of government: The supreme legislative body is the Assembly of SFRY (former Federal Assembly) composed of 308 delegates (220 in Federal Council and 88 in Council of Republics), the cabinet (Federal Executive Council) and the federal administration; The Presidency of SFRY is the highest policymaking body. It is composed of 11 members (including a representative from each Republic of Province).

Suffrage: Universal over age 18; obligatory.

Economic

GNP: \$43.3 billion (1985).

Balance of trade: Imports, \$12.2 billion (c.i.f., 1985); exports, \$10.6 billion (f.o.b., 1985).

Budget: About \$2.6 billion (1984).

Defence

Structure:

The President of Republic is at the same time the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. The highest state body responsible for the command and control of the armed forces is the Presidency of the SFRY. It has a 24-member National Defence Council. The main administrative organ is the Federal Secretariat of National Defence (SSNO) in Belgrade. The Federal Secretariat is responsible for the formulation of National Defence policy, administration, organisation and development and mobilisation of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). Both parts are integrated under the General Staff of YPA (Belgrade).

Total armed forces: Yugoslav People's Army 213,500 (157,000 conscripts); Territorial Defence Forces 1,000,000; Frontier Guards 15,000. **Para-military forces:** People's Militia (Police) 163,000.

Reserves: 580,000.

Conscript service period: 1 year.

Annual military expenditures: \$1.99 billion (1987).

Alliances and organisations: COMECON (observer, participant in some commissions), UN, GATT, G-77, OECD (participates in some activities) and others.

Army Battle Order

Total: 165,000 (110,500 conscripts).

Reserves: 500,000.

Organisation:

7 infantry divisions
5 reserve divisions
9 infantry brigades
7 tank brigades
6 field artillery regiments
3 mountain brigades
6 anti-tank regiments
11 AA artillery regiments
1 airborne brigade
1 marine infantry brigade
4 SAM regiments

Equipment:

Tanks: about 200 T-72/74s (increasing); 760 T-54s/55s; 250 T-34s, 200 M-47 PATTON medium; 100 PT-76 light

Armoured vehicles: BTR-50; BTR-152; M-8; 200 M-3 scout cars; 70 M-3 halftracks; 150 M-60s; 100 M-590; 500 M-980 MICVs; BRDM-2/BTR-40 PB; BOV-1 tank destroyers (SAGGER); some reconnaissance cars

Artillery: 1,800 M-1955; SU-100 100 mm SP; M-198 122 mm; M-30 122 mm; M-46 130 mm; M-37 152 mm; M-48 76 mm; M-2A1 105 mm; M-55 105 mm; M-1 155 mm

Mortars: M-31 and M-68 81 mm; M-8 50 mm; M-57 60 mm; UBM-52 and M-1975 120 mm

RCLs: 57 mm; M-20 75 mm; M-60 82 mm; M-65 105 mm

MRLs: 128 mm

ATK: ASU-57; PAK-40 75 mm; 300 M18 76 mm; M36 90 mm SP; T-12 100 mm towed

ATGW: AT-1 SNAPPER and AT-3 SAGGER

AA artillery: M55 20 mm; 30 mm; M38/39 37 mm; Bofors 40 mm; M50 57 mm; M44 85 mm; FLAK-36 88 mm; 90 mm; 94 mm towed; ZSU-23-4; ZSU-57-2; BOV-3

SAM: SA-6/7/-9

SSM: FROG-7

NB: The T-72/74 MBT is now manufactured under licence.

Naval Battle Order

Manpower: 12,500; includes 1,500 marines (6,000 conscripts).

Reserves: No figures available.

Organisation:

Frigates:

2 Soviet KONI class (SPLIT class)

Submarines:

3 HEROJ class

2 MALA class

2 SUTJESKA class

2 SAVA class

Corvettes:

2+ KOBRA class

2 MORNAR class

1 FOUGUEUX class patrol ship (ex-French)

Light forces:

5 KRALJEVICA class patrol craft

6 KONCAR class missile/gun FACs

10 OSA-1 class missile FACs (ex-Soviet)

15 SHERSHEN class torpedo boats (10 built domestically)

4 Type 158 gunboats

6 MIRNA class patrol boats (4 more being built)

8 Type 131 large patrol boats

Mine warfare forces:

4 VUKOV-KLANAC class coastal minesweepers (ex-French SIRIUS class)

6 M-117 class inshore minesweepers

4 ex-British HAM class inshore minesweepers

14 M-301 river minesweepers

7 NESTIN class river minesweepers

12 DTM-211 class landing craft, tank/ minelayers (ex-German)

22 Type 601 landing craft, attack (LCA)

40 auxiliary and special purpose vessels

20 coastal artillery batteries

Naval aviation: 20 Ka-25 HORMONE, 8 Mi-8 HIP ASW helicopters; unknown number of domestically produced SA-341 GAZELLE helicopters, 2 DHC-2 BEAVERS, and 4 CL 215 amphibians.

NB: Several new KOBRA class missile corvettes are under construction. Unconfirmed reports about a new class of attack submarines.

Naval bases: Lora/Split, Pola, Sibenik, Ploce, Bay of Cattaro.

Air Battle Order

Manpower: 36,000 (7,000 conscripts).

Reserves: No figures available.

Organisation:

12 fighter bomber squadrons with 130 J-1 GALEB/JASTREB; 20 KRAGUJ

9 interceptor squadrons with 200 MiG-21 F/PP/M/N

4 recce squadrons with 15 RT-33, 30 RJ-1 JASTREB

6 transport squadrons: 12 An-12, 10 An-26, 10 Il-14S VIP, 1 Il-18, 6 Yak-40, 4 Li-2, 1 SE-240

CARAVELLE 6N, 2 Boeing 727-200, 2 DC-6B, 2 FALCON 50s, some PC-6s

Trainers: 20 MiG-21 UTI, 30 T-33, 24 GALEB, 60 TJ-1 JASTREB, 30 UTVA-75s

Liaison/utility: UTVA-60, 4 UTVA-70, 8 UTVA-75, 10 UTVA-L-60 BRYGADYR, 14 UTVA-66/51, 2 Gates Learjet 25Bs

Helicopters: 18 Mi-4, 12 Mi-8, 14 Mi-1s, 5 AB-205, 15 SA-316 ALOUETTE III, 8 SA-341 GAZELLE, 124 SOKO PARTIZAN, 10 WHIRLWINDS, 2 A-109s, 2 AB-212s

SAMS: 8 SA-2S, 6 SA-3s

AAMS: ATOLL

On order: New light attack aircraft ORAO/1.A.R. 93 is being produced jointly with Romania; 94 SOKO PARTIZAN helicopters (SA-341 GAZELLE) are being domestically produced.

Yugoslavia is looking for partners in order to develop a new light fighter aircraft to replace its MiG-21s. There are reports that the ORAO is not totally successful, and procurement could be stopped.

Major air bases: Bihac, Batajnica, Banja Luka, Pleso/Zagreb, Mostar, Lucko/Zagreb, Rajlovac, Crklje, Niksic, Sombor, Zabljak, Zemu, Tiograd, Tuzla, Divuje, Butmir/Sarajewo, Zadare, Vrsao, Pula, Nis, Petrovac, Skopje.

2

Asunto: Biografía y personalidad de MARGARET THATCHER

I. Datos generales

MARGARET HILDA ROBERT DE THATCHER



Nació en Grantham, (Lincolnshire), el 13 de octubre de 1925.
(Pertenece al signo de Libra).

Hija de ALFRED ROBERT, dueño de un almacén de remos generales. Su madre es una modesta ama de casa. Tiene una hermana mayor, llamada MURIEL. Tenía además un abuelo zapatero y otro jornalero; el primero de origen galés y el segundo, irlandés.

Como su padre, es de religión metodista. (Secta protestante de gran rigidez de principios).

En 1951, se casó con DENIS THATCHER, industrial conservador, de acomodada situación económica y que había sido My de la Artillería Real, en la 2da guerra mundial. Hasta 1976 desempeñó el cargo de Director de la // Burmah Oil Trading Company Limited y fué Presidente de otras compañías no especificadas.

La preparación intelectual de dicha Sra comprende las realizadas en la escuela privada de Grantham, donde fue la primera alumna becada. Obtiene posteriormente en Oxford beca para licenciatura en química. Allí nace su inquietud política, enrolándose en la Asociación de Estudiantes Conservadores. Con posterioridad a su matrimonio y en 1959 se recibe de abogada y aceptada en el foro de Londres, especializándose en derecho fiscal.



100

En 1957, el matrimonio THATCHER tienen dos hijos gemelos MARK y CAROL, el varón se desempeña actualmente el cargo de ejecutivo en una compañía de AUSTRALIA, y la hija CAROL, licenciada en abogacía, es periodista en AUSTRALIA.

Su carrera es la siguiente:

Desde 1959 integra la Cámara de los Comunes, ese año es Diputada por FINCHLEY, en 1961 fué Secretaria Parlamentaria de Ministro de Pensiones y Seguro Nacional, hasta 1964.

En 1970 Ministro de Educación.



En 1974 Secretaria de Estado del Departamento de Medio Ambiente y vocero del Ministerio de Defensa

Desde el año 1975 como Líder de su Partido viaja por E.E.U.U., CANADA, AUSTRALIA, y el lejano Oriente (CHINA y JAPON)

Desde 1979: Primer Ministro de su país

II. CARACTERISTICAS GENERALES Y PECULIARIDADES.

- a) Origen humilde y provinciano. Infancia y juventud austeras y esforzadas. Debe obtener becas para sus estudios secundarios y universitarios.
- b) Su posición en la Política es el resultado de arduos y profundos esfuerzos.
- c) En OXFORD lleva una vida dedicada al estudio y la lectura. Sus autores favoritos BYRON, ELLIOTT y sobre todo KIPLING.
- d) De su época de estudiante en OXFORD data su admiración por las tesis del Liberalismo Económico.
- f) Fastiga a SHIRLEY WILLIAMS, Ministra laborista de Educación, por haberse promovido a tal cargo desde un entorno social diferente al de la causante.
- g) Es trabajadora incansable (18 Hs por día).
- h) Se erige defensora del liberalismo económico. Su enemigo es el socialismo, que a su criterio, conduce al facismo y al nacionalsocialismo.



lismo, concepto que extrae y asimila de la obra de HAYEK ("EL camino de la servidumbre").

- i) En resumen es severa, fría, impulsiva, dura, perseverante, luchadora, tenaz y elocuente.

III. VULNERABILIDADES


- a) Es emotiva, sensible, se ve disminuída al ser apabullada.
- b) Su apasionamiento la lleva a hablar velozmente y en esas circunstancias, su alocución es de muy difícil asimilación.
- c) Su agresividad y violencia contenidas amenazan con explotar cuando es acicateada.
- d) No es equitativa en la selección de sus interlocutores, en especial entre los periodistas.
- e) Presenta rasgos de gran subjetividad, lo cual lo lleva a perder la exacta dimensión de los problemas que conduce.

V. CONCLUSION


Orgullosa de su origen humilde, habitualmente, se descontrola en el medio ambiente político en el que actúa, asumiendo actitudes propias del fanático político y/o religioso, lo que supone una sobrevaloración de sí misma o sentimiento de ser invencible.

Su orgullo profesional, basado en la eficiencia demostrada en su vida y carrera profesional le ha permitido erigirse en la actualidad en la "Conductora" de un Imperio decadente y nostálgico.

Se considera que dadas las actuales circunstancias es posible que



desoiga consejos, amenazas o directivas de algún otro sector político
pudiendo llegar en su fanatismo a límites impredecibles, pero acordes
a la parábola descendente que transita su país.



Biography

BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN F. STEWART
Director, Intelligence (J-2)
United States Southern Command, Panama

Brigadier General Stewart was commissioned in the Regular Army, Infantry in 1962 from San Jose State College, California. As a company grade officer, he served in command and staff positions with the 1st Battalion, 509th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 8th Infantry Division in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany and with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

As a field grade and military intelligence officer, Brigadier General Stewart served in staff positions with the Defense Intelligence Agency (Estimates), Intelligence Community Staff, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence; and as Assistant Army Attache, Mexico City, Mexico.




During the period 1978-1982, Brigadier General Stewart served as the G2, 9th Infantry Division, and as Commander of the 109th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI) at Fort Lewis, Washington. He assumed command of the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in July 1983 and served as the Senior Intelligence Officer, COMUSFOR, Grenada, during Operation "URGENT FURY," during the period Oct-Dec 1983. He next served as the G2, XVIII Airborne Corps in July 1985 and remained in that position until July 1986, when he arrived in Panama to assume his current position as the Director of Intelligence, J-2, United States Southern Command.

Brigadier General Stewart holds a Masters Degree from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and is a 1983 graduate of the Inter-American Defense College, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.


Brigadier General Stewart and his wife, Patti, have four adult children: Leticia, in Seattle, Washington; Lee, a Captain in the U.S. Army at Fort Lewis, Washington; John, who is a store manager in South Carolina; and Andrea, who is married to Captain Tom Talbot and living in Panama.

(Current as of July 1988)



ST BARTOLAI

Ver de que se trata esto y verne
el 26 Feb 91 con idea del
tiempo que demandara. —



de la Br IM VII en División
del Cuerpo de Ejército 4.


Cabe señalar que pese al incremento
consistente según versiones
(1.323) MILLONES de dólares
de la Ley Reservada del Cobro
CAR FIGUEROA Vicecomandante
1991 será de MIL DOSCIENTOS
de dotación humana y material

- 7) En cuanto a la industria par
rió sus equipos y sistemas d
BRETAÑA), pero a partir de
lación de los derechos human
terial bélico.

Además de los países mencion
oficiales y capitales mixtos
en la actualidad:


- Astilleros y Maestranzas
- Empresa Nacional de Aeronáutica
- Proyectos de Ingenierías
- Fábricas y Maestranzas del

1. O SUBDIR^{CA} Teia
realizar traduccion
de estos Articulos -



HUGO R. RIVERA
Enc. Ayta. 2

22/02/91



TRAINING

Cornerstone of Readiness and Key to Victory

Over the past several weeks, a few editorial writers have made the astounding discovery that American soldiers could die during a war with Iraq. Really. At the same time, stories about soldiers refusing to deploy to Saudi Arabia in favor of conscientious objector status have received considerably more attention than they are due. Even harder to fathom are stories about how Army recruiters have duped large numbers of recruits, offering the promise of a college education while masking the possibilities of potential combat until the contract is made. Obviously, such stories suggest a naivete about the current crisis or the results of a slow news day. Perhaps both. Thankfully, not many remain totally oblivious to the real reason for the Army. A *Kansas City Star* editorial writer observed that a conscientious objector's "flashes of revelation" are especially questionable "long after the enlistment and only at the approach of a clear and present danger."

We are also seeing the testimony of former secretaries of defense and former and serving commanders recommending careful consideration before "exercising the military option." The scribes suggest that our warrior leaders have feet of clay and are losing their resolve to wield military force. Nothing, repeat nothing, could be further from reality. Rather, the military professional, seeing the potential futility and waste in the precipitous use of force, is a realist who knows the uncertainty of war. To their credit, military leaders are going to extreme lengths to inform the public concerning the risk of entering a war. "If war comes," they warn, "it will be intense, high-speed, ferocious, fought night and day, but not quick, easy, or logical."

The reluctance to use force should not be construed as a lack of confidence or the inability to use it. If Saddam Hussein believes that such stories indicate a weakening US resolve regarding his naked aggression, then he will have made his second mistake.

What does all this have to do with training, our theme for this month? Everything. By the middle of the month, the current generation of soldiers may very well face the first real test of its war-fighting capability. The results will show how well this Army has trained and has been equipped for combat against an adversary with a broad range of weaponry, the demonstrated willingness to use it and a combat capability forged and tempered during a grinding eight-year war with Iran. Already, US logistics, mobilization and support systems are being validated in the unprecedented troop deployment. Combat, if it is necessary, will further validate the resurgence in combined arms training during the last 10 years, the management and personnel systems that have grown since the end of the Vietnam War, the Volunteer Army concept, CAPSTONE and, most of all, the philosophies and the systems of training anchored by the combat training centers and fueled by lessons learned in the Mojave Desert.

The importance and the challenge of training are punctuated in Army Chief of Staff General Carl E. Vuono's article, "Training and the Army of the 1990s." Other theme articles address aspects of this critical topic. Training is much too broad to cover in a single issue, and we will return to this theme later. What we intend to do is whet your appetite to read, study and write on training. That you carry even one idea from this issue and adapt it to your training regimen is our goal.

My grade school teacher used to say, "It is too late to study, when you are called upon to recite." The Army may soon be called upon to recite in Southwest Asia. The outcome will show how well we have done our homework.

SFR

TRAINING

and the

ARMY of the 1990s

General Carl E. Vuono, US Army

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or irrevocable as in the Army. —Douglas MacArthur

IN THE spring of 1950, the United States was at peace—an exhausted and uneasy peace in which the world was still reeling from the great cataclysm of World War II. Nobody expected another war; nobody wanted one. Yet, on 25 June, the peace was suddenly and violently shattered as the armies of Kim Il Sung swept into South Korea. A small group of American soldiers was hastily organized into an *ad hoc* task force and was thrust into the breach to try to stem the tide of the North Korean onslaught. These men fought with courage, but they were ill-prepared, poorly equipped and, most importantly, inadequately trained for the tasks they were given. As a result, many of them never came home, and the United States was very nearly run off the Korean peninsula by the army of a backward and impoverished nation.

The lessons of those early days of the Korean War are many and varied, but they all reinforce a powerful message that has been pervasive throughout the history of armed conflict and is of singular relevance to the US Army of today.

That message reminds us from across the ages that training is the decisive factor in the outcome of battle and the ultimate determinant of the fate of the nation.

In this article, I want to discuss the significance of training in the Army of today and the “why” and “how” of training in the Army of tomorrow. For it is training that prepares soldiers, units, and leaders to fight and win in combat—the Army’s basic mission.

The Army Today. As we enter a new decade, the US Army bears little resemblance to the force of 40 years ago. Indeed, as we have witnessed in a year of great challenge, the Army of 1990 is the finest fighting force this nation has ever fielded and the best in the world today. This is more than rhetorical flourish. It is a reality that has been repeatedly demonstrated in exercises throughout the globe, in the crucible of combat in Panama and in Operation *Desert Shield*—the most complex military undertaking in more than a generation.

This Army did not come about by accident. It is the product of a comprehensive and visionary plan that has as its foundation the Army’s six fundamental imperatives—principles that are the benchmark by which we measure every pro-



US Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono visiting troops at a base camp in Saudi Arabia, October 1990.

posal and every program, and form the architecture by which we are building the Army of the future.

These imperatives include an effective warfighting doctrine; a mix of armored, light, and special operations forces; continuous modernization; the development of competent, confident leaders; and an unbending commitment to a quality force. At the base of each of these is the sixth imperative and the top priority for the Army in the field: tough, demanding, realistic training relentlessly executed to uncompromising standards.

For it is training that brings our warfighting doctrine to life; it is training that gives us the indispensable capacity to integrate the various elements of our mix of forces into packages that are effective against specific threats we face. It is training that enables our soldiers to bring to bear the awesome potential of our modern weapons; it is training that builds the kinds of sergeants and officers that our soldiers deserve. And it is training that makes quality Americans commit themselves to join our ranks and quality soldiers commit themselves to a lifetime of selfless service.

In short, it is training that undergirds the Army of today, and it is training that we must sustain as we shape the Army of the future.

It is training that enables our soldiers to bring to bear the awesome potential of our modern weapons; it is training that builds the kinds of sergeants and officers that our soldiers deserve. And it is training that makes quality Americans commit themselves to join our ranks and quality soldiers commit themselves to a lifetime of selfless service.

Why We Train. The fundamental importance of training—a truth that is self-evident to military leaders—is not widely understood by many outside of the profession of arms. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet empire, some have called into question the need to maintain readiness and training within the Army. After all, the argument goes, since the Soviet threat has receded and since the West would have greatly extended warning times of any renewed Soviet military challenge, we can afford to scale back the training and readiness of many of our forces. That is the same argument that we have faced after every war in our history,

and the end of the Cold War is apparently no different.

The events of 2 August 1990 have dampened the public enthusiasm for this perspective, but we can expect it to surface again in the years ahead. So it is important that, within our profession, we clearly understand why training will re-

As we marvel at the collapse of the Soviet empire, we also witness the birth of a new era of uncertainty and peril, an era in which the threats we will confront are themselves ill-defined . . . we must also prepare for the implications of the instability and chaos that historically trail in the wake of the collapsing empires. It is, therefore, critical that we retain the high levels of training that we have achieved within the US Army

main so vital in the years ahead, and that we carefully articulate our training rationale to those whose support is so critical to our future.

The training imperative is driven by three basic and interrelated responsibilities: the Army's strategic obligations in the evolving international environment, the Army's requirement to shape the force for tomorrow, and our sacred duty to our soldiers. Each of these responsibilities is of central importance to the Army and the nation.

The International Environment. Tough, realistic training has always been crucial to our national success, and in the years ahead, the nature of the international environment will reinforce that importance yet again. As we marvel at the collapse of the Soviet empire, we also witness the birth of a new era of uncertainty and peril, an era in which the threats we will confront are themselves ill-defined. Although we applaud the political trends that are occurring within the Warsaw Pact, we must also prepare for the implications of the instability and chaos that

historically trail in the wake of the collapsing empires. It is, therefore, critical that we retain the high levels of training that we have achieved within the US Army, Europe and in those forces earmarked to reinforce our forward deployed units there.

But the days are over in which the major challenges to our national interests rested exclusively on the continent of Europe. The brutal and unprovoked aggression by Iraq against Kuwait is a vivid preview of the nature of the international system in the decade of the 1990s and beyond. Two features of the Iraqi attack underscore the enduring importance of training. First, the attack came with virtually no warning. Had our forces across the entire Army not been trained and ready, the credibility of our response would have been negligible.

Second, we no longer have the luxury of considering the developing world to be militarily insignificant. Iraq struck its neighbor with a sophisticated array of weapons and forces, and with demonstrated capabilities that were once thought to be reserved to the major powers. If we were to deter Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia and be prepared to defeat an attack if deterrence proved unsuccessful, our forces had to be trained and ready from the moment they arrived in the Arabian desert. Moreover, they had to be trained and ready to fight and win on a high-intensity battlefield—a battlefield that included the specter of chemical warfare.

Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf highlights the perilous nature of the evolving international environment and reinforces the undiminished requirement for the Army to be trained and ready. If the wave of the future is the "come as you are" war, then we must be ready to go at all times.

Reshaping the Army. The mandate for trained and ready forces is reinforced by our plan for reshaping the Army of the future. In response to revolutionary developments abroad and resource constraints at home, we have begun to shape a smaller Army—one with fewer soldiers and fewer units.

But even as we shape the future Army, our strategic responsibilities will continue to span the globe. So every soldier, every unit, and every leader within our smaller force structure must be fully trained to fight and win. We cannot afford to adopt a course which some have proposed—a course of so-called tiered readiness in which some of our units are fully trained while others are not. Under such a proposal, it is likely that the forces that are fully trained would be inadequate in number to deter or defeat Iraq-like aggression throughout the world, while short warning times and sophisticated adversaries would deny us the time necessary to bring other forces up to full readiness.


So if we are to be a smaller Army—and we will be—then we can never relax our efforts to establish and achieve the highest standards of training throughout the Army.

Commitment to Soldiers. Finally, we must train with our eyes firmly fixed on our sacred responsibilities to the sons and daughters of this nation who are entrusted to our care. Our soldiers depend upon their leaders to train them in peacetime so that they can fight, win and survive in battle. General "Light Horse" Harry Lee of Revolutionary War fame clearly captured our responsibility when he cautioned that "a government is the murderer of its own citizens when it sends them to the field untrained and untaught." No leader in America's Army must ever be guilty of that most inexcusable lapse of professional responsibility.

So whenever a sergeant takes the extra time to plan his training in precise detail, whenever he spends those extra hours executing his training to exacting standards, whenever he devotes that extra effort to scrupulously assessing his training, he is investing in the lives of his soldiers.

Thus, it is clear that the nature of the evolving international environment, the Army's responsibilities to shape the force for the future, and our enduring obligations to our soldiers all require

the Army of tomorrow be as trained and ready as the Army of today. Accordingly, every Army leader—every sergeant and every offi-



We no longer have the luxury of considering the developing world to be militarily insignificant. Iraq struck its neighbor with a sophisticated array of weapons and forces, and with demonstrated capabilities that were once thought to be reserved to the major powers . . . Iraq's aggression in the Persian Gulf highlights the perilous nature of the evolving international environment and reinforces the undiminished requirement for the Army to be trained and ready. If the wave of the future is the "come as you are" war, then we must be ready to go at all times.

cer—must understand, attain, sustain and enforce the highest standards of combat readiness through tough, realistic, multiechelon combined arms training designed to challenge and develop soldiers, units and leaders.

How We Train. That is the "why" of training. The "how" is embodied in the Army's comprehensive training strategy. As we confront an environment of constrained resources, we must move forward aggressively to shape our training programs at all levels to make the best use of the

assets we are given. Over the past five years, the Army has taken great strides in developing and articulating the training strategy that is presented in US Army Field Manual (FM) 25-100, *Training the Force* and its companion FM

*We cannot afford to adopt . . .
a course of so-called tiered readiness
in which some of our units are fully
trained while others are not . . .
The forces that are fully trained would
be inadequate in number to deter or
defeat Iraq-like aggression throughout
the world, while short warning times and
sophisticated adversaries would deny us
the time necessary to bring other
forces up to full readiness.*

25-101, *Battle Focused Training*. FM 25-100 establishes the Army's training doctrine, and FM 25-101 applies this doctrine and assists leaders in the development and execution of training programs. Together, they are mandatory reading for every leader, sergeant and officer, in the Army.

The overarching principle that will guide our training in the decade of the 1990s will remain straightforward: we will train as we will fight, and we will train to exacting, uncompromising standards. This is an immutable principle that undergirds the entire Army and applies equally to combat, combat support and combat service support units in TOE (table of organization and equipment) organizations and in our general support forces.

Although conditions may change, our standards will not, for they are the yardstick by which we measure our readiness for combat. This fundamental principle means, at its most basic level, that we will train soldiers, units and leaders in combined arms and multiservice joint operations—the kinds of operations that will be required by an environment growing increasingly complex.

Training Soldiers. First, we must develop soldiers who are proficient in battlefield skills, disciplined, physically tough and highly motivated. The training of our individual soldiers is now, and will continue to be, a primary responsibility of our noncommissioned officers—sergeants who, in this first year of a new decade, are the best in our history. Their unparalleled capabilities and unmatched professionalism provide the Army with a vast reservoir of expertise for training our soldiers. Gone are the days in which we had to rely on centralized and inflexible training mechanisms to ensure that standards were being met throughout the Army. Our sergeants are now fully capable of assuming principal responsibility for the development of every soldier.

The training of our soldiers will be focused primarily at home stations and will concentrate on the basics that win in battle. For proficiency in the basics is an unalterable prerequisite for higher level training in every MOS (military occupational specialty).

Training Units. Well trained soldiers are, of course, not enough; they must be molded into cohesive, effective units from squad to corps, and in combat, combat support and combat service support units throughout the Army. Collective training begins at home stations where basic soldier skills are integrated into small-unit proficiency. Unit training then builds warfighting capabilities in successively larger organizations while reinforcing the individual and collective skills upon which the entire structure rests.

The centerpiece of collective proficiency at battalion and brigade levels resides in our combat training centers (CTCs), the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Little Rock Air Force Base and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. The CTCs provide us the indispensable capability to synchronize all elements of the combined arms team in an environment that comes as close to actual combat as our technology permits. The

US soldiers refueling a Hummer in the Ad-Dibdibah region of Saudi Arabia.



The requirements to train soldiers, units and leaders are no less prominent in our Reserve Components. Indeed, as we have seen in Operation Desert Shield, the Total Force concept is fundamental to the defense of our nation in an era of increasing uncertainty and challenge. Today in the Arabian desert, soldiers from the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are serving shoulder-to-shoulder with their Active Component counterparts.

value of the CTCs cannot be overstated, and the payoff is measured in the performance of our units in battle. In an analysis of the fight in Panama, commanders repeatedly said that the JRTC was the single most important element in their units' success. And a decade of investment in the NTC has created a level of proficiency in desert operations that is the foundation of deterrence—and the basis for victory if battle should become necessary—on the Arabian peninsula today.

A crucial element in achieving unit proficiency is the training of battle staffs. The battle staff, consisting of primary representatives from all staff and slice elements, must be trained to integrate the seven battlefield operating systems. These major functions must be executed if we are to fight and win in combat.

Special mention must also be made of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP)

which hones critical command and control skills at division and corps levels. BCTP represents the top of the training pyramid that rests upon the foundation of individual soldier skills and forms an Army that is trained and ready to fulfill its strategic mandate worldwide. BCTP is now being used by *Desert Shield* units to reinforce the skills required of commanders and staffs.

Training Leaders. Even as we develop the combat skills of our soldiers and units, we must continue to ensure that our leaders are fully trained at every echelon as an investment in the Army of today and tomorrow. For, in the profession of arms, there is no substitute for the leadership of a team of professionals who are competent in the art of war, responsible for their soldiers, and committed to the defense of the nation.

Training of leaders is the primary focus of the Army's leader development program—a progressive, sequential and comprehensive



M1 Abrams tanks at the
Combat Maneuver Training
Center, Hohenfels, Germany

The centerpiece of collective proficiency at battalion and brigade levels resides in our combat training centers . . . [They] provide us the indispensable capability to synchronize all elements of the combined arms team in an environment that comes as close to actual combat as our technology permits. The value of the CTCs cannot be overstated, and the payoff is measured in the performance of our units in battle [as during] the fight in Panama.

approach that embraces officers, sergeants and civilians. It rests on the three pillars of institutional education, operational assignments and self-development, and has been embedded in a range of Army courses, regulations, field manuals, pamphlets and circulars. In the near future, the Army will promulgate a single, capstone document that will provide guidelines for leaders at all levels to ensure that their subordinates grow into the kinds of leaders that the Army will need in the future.

Our leader development program has already produced legions of leaders—sergeants and officers—who form an unbreakable team and who are competent and confident in leading our magnificent soldiers. Moreover, as a result of our leader development program and the commitment of our leaders today, tomorrow's Army leaders will be even better.

The requirements to train soldiers, units and leaders are no less prominent in our Reserve

Components. Indeed, as we have seen in Operation *Desert Shield*, the Total Force concept is fundamental to the defense of our nation in an era of increasing uncertainty and challenge. Today in the Arabian desert, soldiers from the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are serving shoulder-to-shoulder with their Active Component counterparts and, together, they form a single Army force that has deterred Iraqi aggression and is poised to respond to the call of the president.

The rapid assimilation of Reserve Component forces in *Desert Shield* is a testimony to the standards of training that these units have achieved. In the future, these standards must not be relaxed. To be sure, training in the Reserve Components presents unique challenges that are not faced by Active Component forces. In recognition of this fact of life, the Army's Reserve Component Training Development Action Plan (RCTDAP) has been specifically

COMANDO SUR DE LOS EE UU

GRL BR. JOHN F. STEWART

DIRECTOR INTELIGENCIA (J-2)

COMANDO SUR EE UU, PANAMA.

El Gr1 Br. STEWART entró al Ejército Regular Infantería en 1962 al egresar del Colegio Estatal SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA. Como oficial subalterno sirvió en puestos de Comando y Estado Mayor en el 1er Batallón del 509avo Regimiento de Infantería Aerotransportado, la 8va División de Infantería en MAINZ (RFA) y con el Comando de Asistencia Militar, en VIETNAM.

Como oficial de grado superior y oficial de Inteligencia Militar, el Gr1 Br. STEWART desempeñó puestos de Estado Mayor con la Agencia de Inteligencia Defensa (apreciación), Estado Mayor de la Comunidad de Inteligencia, Oficina del Director de Inteligencia Central; y como Auxiliar del Agregado Militar en México.

Durante el período 1978-82, el Oficial Superior desempeñó el cargo de G-2 en la 9na División de Infantería, y como Comandante del 109vo Batallón de Inteligencia Militar (CEWI) en el Fuerte LEWIS, WASHINGTON. Asumió el Comando de la 525ava Brigada de Inteligencia Militar (Aerotransportada) del Fuerte BRAGG, Carolina del Norte, en Jul 83 y se desempeñó como Oficial Superior de Inteligencia, COJUSFOR, en GRANADA durante la operación "Furia Urgente" en el período Oct-Dic 1983. Luego se desempeñó como G-2 del XVIII Cuerpo Aerotransportado desde Jul 85 hasta Jul 86. En ese mes llegó a Panamá para asumir su actual cargo como Director de Inteligencia, J-2, del Comando Sur EE UU.

El Gr1 Br. STEWART posee un Master en Estudios Internacional Avanzados, otorgado por la Universidad JOHN HOPKINS y Es egresado (1983) del Colegio Interamericano de Defensa, Fuerte Mc NAIR, WASHINGTON DC.

El Gr1 Br. STEWART y su esposa, PATTI, tienen 4 hijos adultos: Leti-
cia, en SEATTLE, WASHINGTON; Lee, Capitán del Ejército de EE UU en Fuerte
LEWIS, WASHINGTON; John, administrador de un negocio en Carolina del Norte;
y Andrea, casada con el Capitán TOM TALBOT y vive en PANAMA.

GRL BR. JOHN F. STEWART, DIRECTOR DE INTELIGENCIA (J-2) COMANDO SUR EE UU,
PANAMA.

El visitante que nos honra con su presencia, General de Brigada JOHN F. STEWART, de vasta trayectoria en el campo de Inteligencia, inició su carrera militar en 1962, desempeñándose en la actualidad como J-2 del Comando Sur de los EE UU (PANAMA), puesto desde el cual mantiene una estrecha relación con todos los países que conforman el área de responsabilidad de dicho Comando, entre ellos la ARGENTINA.

Su actual cargo, y el desempeñado como Auxiliar del Agregado Militar de MEXICO, otorgan al señor General un destacable conocimiento de la problemática latinoamericana, que seguramente será de gran utilidad para consolidar los vínculos entre los Ejércitos de los países del área, con el Ejército de los EE UU, a la vez para lograr entendimientos que hagan al interés recíproco de nuestras FFAA.

Por su desempeño como Jefe de Unidades de Inteligencia Militar, como miembro del Estado Mayor de Grandes Unidades de Combate y Batalla y en cargos de jerarquía de su especialidad en el orden Nacional, la visita del Grl Br. STEWART, nos dejará, a no dudarlo, interesantes experiencias que serán de gran provecho para quienes tenemos la responsabilidad de Inteligencia en el Ejército Argentino.

designed to focus reserve component training and to help commanders make the best use out of the resources (time and money) that they are given. As in the active forces, the conditions may change, but the standards do not.

Training Mandate. Thus, the Army's training strategy, our "how to" principles, are based on our enduring commitment to train as we fight, and to train each of our soldiers, units and leaders to exacting, uncompromising standards that must be maintained in every combat, combat support and combat service support unit throughout the Army.

As we look to the future, we must build on this strategy, and we must design our training programs to maximize the efficient use of the resources we are given. We must fully exploit the opportunities afforded by simulation technology to polish battlefield skills at all levels while continuing to conduct realistic maneuver and live fire training. We must train with imagination, diligence and innovation, while maintaining a steady course towards our ultimate objective: an Army that is trained and ready to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Nearly 40 years after the tragedy of those first days of Korea, the Army was again called upon to confront a threat to our nation's security, this time in Panama. But, unlike the Army of 1950, the Army of 1989 was trained and it was ready. Striking with deadly precision and overwhelming force, the Army's airborne, Ranger, mechanized, armor and special operations forces crushed the enemy in a massive, coordinated strike and restored freedom to a people long oppressed.

Seven months later, that same Army was directed to meet the challenge of ruthless aggres-

sion in the Middle East. Responding to a complex requirement with unprecedented success, the Army projected more combat power over greater distances in a shorter time than at any other point in the history of armed conflict. Aggression was stopped and a multinational al-

The overarching principle that will guide our training in the decade of the 1990s will remain straight-forward: we will train as we will fight, and we will train to exacting, uncompromising standards. This is an immutable principle that undergirds the entire Army and applies equally to combat, combat support and combat service support units in TOE organizations and in our general support forces.

liance headed by the United States stood ready to execute any option elected by the president.

Just Cause and Desert Shield were successful only because the soldiers, units and leaders of the US Army were trained to fulfill their strategic responsibilities to the nation. That is the final standard that we, as leaders in the Army today, must achieve in this decade and far into the next century.

Training remains the Army's top priority; it prepares us to fight. As leaders—as sergeants and officers—it is our sacred responsibility to ensure that no soldier ever dies in combat because that soldier was not properly trained. The American people—and America's soldiers—expect and deserve no less. **MR**

General Carl E. Vuono assumed the duties of the chief of staff of the US Army in June 1987. Prior to that, he was commanding general of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command. His recent assignments include: Army deputy chief of staff for operations; commanding general, 8th Infantry Division (Mech); and commanding general, Combined Arms Center. He also served as: assistant division commander, 1st Infantry Division; and commander, 82d Airborne Division Artillery. During the Vietnam War, he commanded two artillery battalions in the 1st Cavalry Division. His article, "Professionalism and the Army of the 1990s," appeared in the April 1990 issue of Military Review.

INTRODUCCION

ENTRENAMIENTO

Pierda fundamental del estado de preparación y clave para la victoria

Durante las últimas semanas algunos escritores de editoriales descubrieron que los soldados norteamericanos podrían morir durante una guerra con IRAK. Al mismo tiempo aparecieron cuentos sobre el rechazo de algunos soldados a su envío a ARABIA SAUDITA.

También se oyen las declaraciones de algunos ex secretarios de defensa y ex comandantes y algunos de ellos en actividad recomendando la cuidadosa reflexión antes de "ejercitar la opción militar". Los escritos sugieren que nuestros líderes tienen debilidades y están perdiendo su capacidad para manejar la fuerza militar. Nada de eso es cierto. El profesional militar sabe sobre la incertidumbre de la guerra. Los jefes militares, para su crédito, están informando al pueblo sobre los riesgos de entrar en una guerra. "Si llega la guerra", ellos dicen "será intensa, de gran velocidad, feroz, con combates diurnos y nocturnos, pero no ligera, fácil o 'quirúrgica'".

La renuencia a emplear la fuerza no debe analizarse como una falta de confianza o la incapacidad de emplearla. Si HUSSEIN cree que dichos cuentos indican el debilitamiento de los EEUU para resolver su agresión abierta, entonces el habrá cometido su segundo error.

Qué tiene que ver esto con el tema del mes que es el entrenamiento? Todo. A mediados de mes los soldados pueden enfrentarse a su primer combate real. Los resultados señalarán el grado de entrenamiento que poseen y su equipo en una lucha contra un enemigo con una amplia gama de armamento, el demostrado deseo de emplearlo y una experiencia de combate obtenido durante la guerra de 8 años contra IRAN. Ya se han ratificado los sistemas de apoyo, movilización y logístico de EEUU en el despliegue de tropas que no tiene precedentes. El combate, si fuera necesario, ratificará aún más el resurgimiento en el entrenamiento de las armas combinadas durante los últimos 10 años, los sistemas de manejo y de personal que han crecido desde la finalización de la guerra de VIETNAM, el concepto del Ejército Voluntario (CAPSTONE), y por sobre todo, las filosofías y los sistemas de entrenamiento asegurados por los centros de entrenamiento de combate y alimentados por las lecciones que se aprendieron en el Desierto de MOJAVE (EEUU).

La importancia del entrenamiento está puntualizado en el artículo escrito por el Gr1 CARL E VUONO, Jefe de EM del Ejército, " El entrenamiento y el Ejército de la Década del 90".

EL ENTRENAMIENTO Y EL EJERCITO DE LA DECADA DEL 90
Gr1 CARL E VUONO, Ejército de EEUU.

En la primavera del año 1950 EEUU estaba en paz- una paz exhausta e inquietante en la que el mundo aun sentía el gran cataclismo de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Nadie esperaba otra guerra, nadie la deseaba. Sin embargo, el 25 Jun, se rompió la paz a medida que el ejército de KIM IL SUNG invadió COREA DEL SUR. Un pequeño grupo de soldados norteamericanos fue rápidamente organizado en una fuerza de tarea y fue lanzado a la playa para tratar de frenar el asalto de COREA DEL NORTE. Estos hombres combatieron con coraje, pero estaban mal preparados, mal equipados y peor de todos, mal entrenados para las tareas que debían llevar a cabo. Como resultado de ello, muchos de ellos nunca volvieron a sus hogares, y EEUU casi fue corrida fuera de la península por el ejército de una nación pobre y subdesarrollada.

La guerra de COREA arrojó muchas lecciones, pero todas refuerzan un importante mensaje que es permanente a través de la historia de los conflictos armados y es de suma relevancia para el ejército de EEUU de hoy en día.

Ese mensaje nos recuerda que a lo largo del tiempo el entrenamiento constituye un factor decisivo en el resultado de la batalla y el principal determinante del destino de una nación.

En este artículo quiero disertar sobre la importancia del entrenamiento en el Ejército moderno y el "por qué" y "cómo" del entrenamiento del Ejército del mañana. El entrenamiento es lo que prepara a los soldados, a las unidades y a los jefes para combatir y ganar en el combate- que constituye la misión básica del Ejército.

EL EJERCITO DE HOY EN DIA: A medida que entramos en una nueva década, el ejército de EEUU tiene muy poca semejanza con la fuerza de la década del 40. Por cierto, como se observó en este año de grandes desafíos, el Ejército del 90 es la mejor fuerza de combate que la nación haya tenido y da mejor en el mundo moderno. Esto es más que una expresión florida. Es una realidad que se demostró repetidas veces en los ejercicios en todo el mundo, en el crisol de combate en PANAMA y en la OPERACION ESCUDO DEL DESIERTO- el emprendimiento militar más complejo en más de una generación.

Este ejército no apareció por accidente. Es el producto de un plan comprensivo y visionario que tiene como cimiento los seis imperativos fundamentales del Ejército- los principios que utilizamos para medir cada propuesta y cada programa y formamos la infraestructura a través de la cual estamos construyendo el ejército del futuro. Estos imperativos incluyen una efectiva doctrina de combate; una mezcla de fuerzas blindadas, livianas y de operaciones especiales; la continua modernización; el desarrollo de líderes confiables y competentes; y el compromiso inflexible a una fuerza de calidad. En la base de cada uno de éstos se ubica el sexto imperativo y el de fundamental importancia para el ejército en campaña: el entrenamiento duro, exigente y real ejecutado inflexiblemente a niveles inexorables.

El entrenamiento es lo que le da vida a nuestra doctrina de guerra; el entrenamiento nos capacita para integrar los diversos elementos de la mezcla de fuerzas en un paquete contra las amenazas específicas que nos enfrentan. El entrenamiento le permite a nuestros soldados verificar el potencial de las armas modernas; el entrenamiento es lo que construye el tipo de oficiales y sargentos que merecen nuestros soldados. El entrenamiento hace que los norteamericanos capaces se comprometan a unirse a nuestras filas y a los soldados de calidad a comprometerse a una vida de servicio desinteresada. En resumen, el entrenamiento es lo que sostiene al ejército moderno, y debemos mantener dicho entrenamiento a medida que formamos el ejército del futuro.

POR QUE SE ENTRENA: La importancia fundamental del entrenamiento- una verdad que es manifiesta para los líderes militares- no está del todo claro para muchos que están fuera de la profesión. Después de la caída del imperio soviético, algunos han cuestionado la necesidad de mantener el estado de alerta y el entrenamiento en el Ejército. Después de todo, afirman, dado que ha retrocedido la amenaza soviética y que el Occidente tendría mucho tiempo de aviso ante una nueva amenaza soviética, se podría reducir el entrenamiento y el estado de alerta de muchas de nuestras fuerzas. Es el mismo argumento que se viene enfrentando después de cada guerra y por lo que se ve el fin de la Guerra Fría no es un excepción.

Los hechos del 02 Ago 90 han empañado el entusiasmo público de esa perspectiva, pero probablemente surja otra vez en los años venideros. Por lo tanto, es primordial que se sepa dentro de la fuerza y se entienda claramente el porqué el entrenamiento será vital en los años que vendrán, y que se anuncie claramente la razón de ser del entrenamiento a aquellos cuyo apoyo es fundamental para nuestro futuro.

El imperativo del entrenamiento está dirigido por tres responsabilidades básicas e interrelacionadas: las obligaciones estratégicas del Ejército en un medio internacional que evoluciona, el requerimiento del Ejército para formar la fuerza del mañana y nuestro deber sagrado hacia nuestros soldados. Cada una de estas responsabilidades es de fundamental importancia para el Ejército y la Nación.

EL MEDIO INTERNACIONAL: El entrenamiento real y duro siempre fue crucial para el éxito de nuestra nación, y en los años venideros, la naturaleza del medio internacional reforzará este principio. A medida que se valora la caída del imperio soviético, también se observa el nacimiento de una nueva era de incertidumbre y de peligro, una era en que las amenazas que se enfrentarán no están claramente definidas. A pesar de que se aplaudan las tendencias políticas del Pacto de Varsovia, también se debe estar preparado para las implicaciones de la inestabilidad y caos que históricamente siguen al colapso de un imperio. Por lo tanto es fundamental que se mantengan los elevados niveles de entrenamiento que se lograron dentro del Ejército de EEUU, en EUROPA y en las fuerzas elegidas para el refuerzo de nuestros despliegues.

Peró se terminaron los días en que el principal desafío a nuestros intereses yacía exclusivamente en el continente europeo. El ataque de IRAK a KUWAIT es una muestra de ello. Dos características del ataque iraquí subrayan la importancia del entrenamiento. Por un lado el ataque se llevó adelante virtualmente sin ningún tipo de aviso. Si las fuerzas de nuestro ejército no hubieran estado entrenadas y en estado de alerta, la credibilidad de nuestra respuesta hubiese sido insignificante.

Por otra parte, ya no se puede dar el lujo de considerar al mundo en desarrollo de ser militarmente insignificante. IRAK atacó a su vecino con un arsenal de armas y fuerzas sofisticadas, y con una capacidad que en una época estaba sólo reservada para las principales potencias. Si tuviéramos que disuadir la agresión iraquí contra ARABIA SAUDITA y estar preparados para detrotar la agresión y no fuera exitosa la disuasión, nuestras fuerzas hubieran tenido que estar preparadas para el combate ni bien aterrizaban en el desierto Arábigo. Es más, hubieran tenido que estar preparadas y entrenadas para un combate de gran intensidad que incluya la guerra química.

La agresión iraquí en el GOLFO resalta la peligrosa naturaleza del medio internacional que está en evolución y refuerza el requerimiento para que el ejército esté entrenado y en estado de alerta. Si la ola del futuro es una guerra"que estalla en cualquier parte" entonces debemos estar preparado en todo momento.

RESESTRUCTURAR AL EJERCITO: La necesidad de fuerzas entrenadas y listas para el combate está reforzada por el plan que existe para redimensionar al Ejército en el futuro. En respuesta a los desarrollos revolucionarios en el exterior y a la restricción de recursos en el interior se comenzó a estructurar un ejército de menor tamaño, con menor cantidad de soldados y menor cantidad de unidades.

Pero a medida que se forma el Ejército del futuro las responsabilidades estratégicas continuarán cubriendo todo el globo. De modo que cada soldado, cada unidad y cada jefe dentro de nuestro ejército de menor tamaño deberá estar completamente entrenado para combatir y triunfar. No se puede adoptar el curso que algunos propusieron, es decir estar listo a medias donde algunas de las unidades están totalmente entrenadas mientras que las otras no lo están. Bajo dicha propuesta, es probable que las fuerzas que están totalmente entrenadas no alcancen en cantidad para disuadir o derrotar a una agresión parecida a la de IRAK en el mundo, mientras que los adversarios sofisticados y el corto tiempo de aviso nos negaría el tiempo necesario para elevar el número de otras fuerzas a estar totalmente preparadas.

Por lo tanto si vamos a ser un ejército de menor tamaño, y lo seremos, entonces no podemos bajar los brazos en nuestro esfuerzo para establecer y lograr los más altos niveles en el entrenamiento en todo el Ejército.

COMPROMISO CON LOS SOLDADOS: Por último, se debe entrenar con los ojos puestos firmemente en la responsabilidad sagrada que se tiene con los hijos e hijas de la nación a quienes debemos cuidar. Nuestros soldados dependen de sus jefes para entrenarlos en tiempo de paz para que puedan combatir, ganar y sobrevivir en la batalla. El Gr1 HARRY LEE definió claramente nuestra responsabilidad cuando alertó que "el gobierno es el asesino de sus ciudadanos cuando los envía al campo sin entrenar y sin capacitación".

De modo que cuando un sargento se toma un tiempo adicional para planificar su entrenamiento con detalles precisos y cuando pone un esfuerzo adicional para evaluar escrupulosamente su entrenamiento, él está invirtiendo en la vida de sus soldados.

Por lo tanto está claro que la cambiante naturaleza del medio internacional, la responsabilidad del ejército de formar la fuerza del futuro y nuestras obligaciones para con nuestros soldados requieren que el Ejército del mañana esté tan entrenado y listo para el combate como lo está el Ejército de hoy. Al mismo tiempo cada jefe, cada sargento y cada oficial debe entender, lograr, sostener y exigir los principios más altos de combate a través del entrenamiento duro, real, y combinado diseñado para desafiar y desarrollar a los soldados, a las unidades y a los jefes.

COMO SE ENTRENA: El modo de entrenar está organizado en la estrategia de entrenamiento del Ejército. A medida que nos enfrentamos con un medio de recursos limitados, debemos avanzar agresivamente para adecuar los programas de entrenamiento en todos los niveles para poder sacar el mejor provecho de todos los bienes que se nos otorgan. A lo largo de los últimos 5 años el Ejército desarrolló la estrategia de entrenamiento que se presenta en el Manual de Campaña (MC) 25-100 "Entrenamiento de la Fuerza" y el MC 25-101 "Entrenamiento concentrado en la Batalla" del Ejército de EEUU. El MC 25-100 establece la doctrina de entrenamiento del Ejército mientras que el 25-101 aplica esa doctrina y ayuda a los jefes en el desarrollo y ejecución de los programas de entrenamiento. Los dos manuales son de lectura obligatoria para los jefes, sargentos y oficiales del Ejército.

El principio que guiará el entrenamiento en la década del 90 permanecerá claro: se entrenará como si se estuviera combatiendo y se entrenará según normas precisas e inflexibles. Este es un principio inmutable que unifica a todo el ejército y que se aplica con el mismo criterio a las unidades de combate, de apoyo de combate y de servicio de apoyo de combate en las organizaciones del TOE (Tabla de organización y equipo) y en las fuerzas de apoyo en general.

A pesar de que las condiciones pueden cambiar lo que no variará son nuestras normas dado que constituyen el patrón mediante el cual medimos nuestro estado de preparación para el combate. Este principio fundamental significa que se entrenarán a los soldados, a las unidades y jefes en operaciones de armas combinadas y conjuntas con varias fuerzas, es decir el tipo de operación que se requerirá en un medio que crece constantemente y es cada vez más complejo.

ENTRENAR A LOS SOLDADOS: En primer lugar se deben desarrollar soldados que sean expertos en las destrezas del campo de combate, que sean disciplinados, tengan un buen estado físico y estén altamente motivados. El entrenamiento de los soldados es y será responsabilidad de los suboficiales que, en este primer año de la nueva década, son los mejores que se hallan tenido en nuestra historia. Su inigualada capacidad y profesionalismo sin par le ofrece al ejército una vasta reserva de experiencia para el entrenamiento de los soldados. Ya pasó aquella época en que se debía confiar en mecanismos de entrenamiento inflexible y centralizados para asegurar que se estaban cumpliendo las normas en todo el ejército. Nuestros suboficiales están en la actualidad totalmente capacitados para asumir la responsabilidad primaria en el desarrollo de cada soldado. El entrenamiento de los soldados estará principalmente puntualizado en las bases nacionales y se concentrará en los principios que sirven para ganar la batalla. El hecho de conocer en profundidad los principios es un prerequisite inalterable para el entrenamiento de nivel superior en cada MOS (Especialidad ocupacional militar).

ENTRENAR A LAS UNIDADES: Por supuesto que no es suficiente tener soldados bien entrenados. Ellos deben estar moldeados en unidades efectivas y coherentes desde el nivel de los escuadrones hasta el nivel de cuerpo y en las unidades de combate, apoyo de combate y servicio de apoyo de combate en todo el Ejército. El entrenamiento colectivo comienza en las bases del territorio nacional donde se integran las destrezas básicas del soldado en pequeñas unidades. Luego, el entrenamiento de las unidades forma la capacidad de combate de las organizaciones mayores mientras que se refuerzan las destrezas individuales y colectivas sobre las cuales se basa toda la estructura.

El pilar de la destreza colectiva a nivel de batallón y brigada yace en los centros de entrenamiento de combate (CEC): el Centro de Entrenamiento Nacional (CEN) en FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA, el Centro de Entrenamiento Conjunto de Preparación para el Combate (CEPC) en LITTLE ROCK AIR FORCE BASE y FORT CHAFFE, ARKANSAS, y el Centro de Entrenamiento de Maniobra de Combate (CEMC) en HOHENFELS, ALEMANIA. Los centros de entrenamiento nos otorgan la capacidad indispensable de sincronizar a todos los elementos de un equipo de armas combinado en un medio que se asemeja lo más posible a un combate real. No se puede exagerar el valor de los centros de entrenamiento y los resultados se miden a través del rendimiento de las unidades en el combate. En el análisis del combate de PANAMA los comandantes afirmaron en varias ocasiones que el elemento más importante en el éxito de sus unidades fue el entrenamiento realizado en el CEPC. Asimismo la inversión a lo largo de una década en el CEN creó un nivel de destreza en operaciones del desierto que forman la base de la disuasión en la península arabiga en este momento, y el principio de la victoria si fuera necesaria la batalla.

Un elemento crucial en lograr la destreza de la unidad es el entrenamiento de los estados mayores de combate. El estado mayor de combate, integrado principalmente por representantes de todos los estados mayores y elementos independientes, debe entrenarse para integrar a los siete sistemas que operan en el campo de combate. Es necesario que se ejecuten estas funciones de gran importancia si se va a combatir y ganar en el combate.

También se debe hacer una mención especial al Programa de Entrenamiento del Comando de Batalla (CECB) que afina las destrezas de comando y control a nivel de división y cuerpo. El CECB representa la cima de la pirámide de entrenamiento que descansa sobre

la base de las destrezas de cada soldado y constituye un ejército que está preparado y entrenado para cumplir función estratégica en todo el mundo. En la actualidad el CECB está siendo utilizado por las unidades del ESCUDO DEL DESIERTO para reforzar las destrezas requeridas por los comandantes y estados mayores.

ENTRENAR A LOS JEFES: A igual que se desarrollan las destrezas de combate de los soldados y las unidades es necesario asegurar que los jefes estén totalmente entrenados en cada uno de los niveles como inversión para el Ejército de hoy y de mañana. En la profesión de las armas no existe reemplazo para el liderazgo de un equipo de profesionales que sean competentes en el arte de la guerra, responsable de sus soldados y comprometidos a la defensa de la nación.

El entrenamiento de los jefes constituye el principal enfoque del programa de desarrollo de jefes del Ejército, un acercamiento progresivo, secuencial y comprensivo que abarca a oficiales, suboficiales y civiles. Se base en tres pilares: la educación institucional, las tareas operacionales y el autodesarrollo, y se fijaron en una serie de cursos, normas, manuales de campaña, panfletos y circulares del Ejército. En un futuro cercano, el Ejército editará un documento único que ofrece los lineamientos para los jefes en todos los niveles de modo que se asegure que sus subordinados crezcan para formar la clase de jefes que se necesitarán en el Ejército del futuro.

El programa de desarrollo de jefes ya instruyó a una legión de jefes -oficiales y suboficiales- que forman un equipo inquebrantable y que son competentes en el mando de nuestros magníficos soldados.

Los requerimientos para entrenar a los soldados, a las unidades y a los jefes de la Reserva también es prominente. Por cierto, como se observó en la operación ESCUDO DEL DESIERTO, el concepto de la Fuerza Total es fundamental para la defensa de nuestra nación en una era de crecientes incertidumbres y desafíos. Hoy en día en el desierto Arabigo, los soldados de la Reserva del Ejército y de la Guardia Nacional del Ejército están sirviendo cuerpo a cuerpo junto a las unidades activas y, juntos, constituyen una fuerza única dispuesta a responder al llamado del Presidente.

La rápida asimilación de las fuerzas del Componente de la Reserva en el ESCUDO DEL DESIERTO sirve de testimonio para indicar el grado de entrenamiento que dicha fuerza poseía. Ese nivel de entrenamiento no debe reducirse en el futuro. El entrenamiento de los componentes de la Reserva presenta desafíos únicos que no enfrentan las fuerzas Activas. Es por eso que se elaboró el Plan de Acción de Desarrollo de Entrenamiento del Componente de Reserva del Ejército (PADECR). Dicho plan ayudará a los comandantes a sacar el mayor provecho de los recursos que poseen (dinero y tiempo). Al igual que en las fuerzas activas las condiciones pueden cambiar pero las normas serán las mismas.

OBLIGACION DEL ENTRENAMIENTO: Por lo tanto la estrategia de entrenamiento del Ejército se basa en el compromiso permanente de entrenar mientras se combate y de entrenar a cada soldado, unidad y jefe según las normas inflexibles que deben mantenerse en cada unidad de combate, de apoyo de combate y de servicio de apoyo de combate en todo el Ejército.

A medida que miramos el futuro debemos construirnos sobre esta estrategia y debemos diseñar nuestros programas de entrenamiento para aprovechar al máximo el uso de los recursos que nos otorgan. Debemos explotar al máximo las oportunidades ofrecidas por la tecnología de la simulación para pulir las destrezas del campo de batalla en todos los niveles mientras que se continúa realizando maniobras reales y entrenamiento de fuego en vivo. Se debe entrenar con imaginación, diligencia e innovación mientras que se mantiene el objetivo final: un Ejército que esté entrenado y listo para enfrentarse a los desafíos del siglo 21.

Pasaron casi 40 años de la tragedia de COREA. El Ejército fue nuevamente llamado para hacerle frente a la amenaza de la seguridad nacional, esta vez en PANAMA. Pero a diferencia del Ejército de la década del 50, el de 1989 estaba entrenado y listo para el combate. Con precisión mortal las fuerzas aerotransportadas de EEUU aplastaron al enemigo en un ataque coordinado y restauraron la libertad.

Siete meses después se empleó ese mismo Ejército para hacer frente a una agresión en el MEDIO ORIENTE. En respuesta a un requerimiento complejo con un éxito sin precedente, el Ejército envió más poder de fuego sobre mayores distancias y en menor tiempo que en cualquier otro momento de un conflicto armado. Se detuvo la agresión y se formó una fuerza aliada encabezada por EEUU lista para ejecutar la decisión del presidente.

CAUSA JUSTA y ESCUDO DEL DESIERTO tuvieron éxito dado que los soldados, unidades y jefes del Ejército estaban entrenados para cumplir su responsabilidad estratégica con la nación.

El entrenamiento sigue siendo la principal prioridad del Ejército; nos prepara para el combate. Como jefes tenemos la responsabilidad sagrada de asegurar que ningún soldado muera en combate debido a que estaba mal entrenado.

187

ENRENAMIENTO Y EDUCACION PARA LOS LIDERES DEL FUTURO

Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor del Ejército de EEUU.

En Ene 90 el Gr1 VUONO detalló en su libro "Una fuerza Estratégica para la Década del 90" su visión del Ejército. En este documento se encuentran detallados los roles e imperativos estratégicos del Ejército unidos a un ejército versátil, desplegable y letal.

Basado en este documento y en otros, la Escuela de EM comenzó a revisar el programa del Curso de Oficiales de Comando y Estado Mayor (COCEM) de 1989. Esta revisión, que será introducida en 1991-92, está diseñada para entrenar a los líderes para satisfacer las necesidades futuras del Ejército.

LA NECESIDAD DEL CAMBIO

Desde la II Guerra Mundial una de las principales misiones del Ejército ha sido la de defender a EUROPA. Por lo tanto el programa del COCEM se concentró principalmente en esa región. Por generaciones los oficiales egresados se entrenaban para combatir contra los soviéticos. Los cambios ocurridos en la década del 80 hizo que el Ejército cambiara su punto de vista con respecto a su función en EUROPA y en el resto del mundo. Los líderes del ejército se dieron cuenta que el mundo multipolar le presenta exigencias inusuales a las instituciones militares de EEUU, en particular en las FFAA y sus líderes. Este hecho hizo que se definieran las 5 funciones estratégicas del Ejército. El punto clave de este concepto es el mantener una menor cantidad de fuerzas listas para el combate - fuerzas desplegadas respaldadas por combate- (pesadas, livianas y de operaciones especiales) en los EEUU, listas para su despliegue mundial para responder a distintas situaciones.


Simultáneamente con la creciente necesidad de reenfocar los esfuerzos del ejército sobre la inmediata preparación para las operaciones de contingencias se está produciendo un poderoso desarrollo. Este desarrollo, que constituye el sexto imperativo del ejército del 90, es la formación de los líderes. Este asunto se vio perfectamente demostrado en la Operación CAUSA JUSTA y en la Operación ESCUDO DEL DESIERTO. Diariamente se están instruyendo a los oficiales y suboficiales con un sistema educativo profesional y progresivo. El sistema de desarrollo de líderes proporciona la base para el éxito profesional a través de los nombramientos progresivos hasta los nombramientos de mayor nivel de responsabilidad; un sistema de promoción basado en un potencial demostrado y el aliento del continuo autodesarrollo a través del estudio.

El COCEM formará oficiales no solo teniendo en cuenta los desafíos externos sino además mediante la comprensión de las capacidades actuales de nuestros líderes en todos los niveles, a quienes se debe preparar para satisfacer los nuevos desafíos. Los programas de Acción para el Desarrollo de líderes para Oficiales y Suboficiales con sus correspondientes sistemas de educación, los Sistemas de Normas de Graduación Militar (MQS I y II) y el emergente Plan de Acción para el Desarrollo del Líder Civil y los sistemas de cursos constituyen poderosos mecanismos para la formación del liderazgo del Ejército para el futuro.

Teniendo en cuenta todos estos aspectos, los líderes del COCEM comenzaron a modificar sus programas para reflejar los futuros roles del ejército.

PROCESO DE CAMBIO

Los primeros pasos en el proceso de diseño analizaron hacia donde se dirige el Ejército, la revisión de las misiones y objetivos del COCEM y el análisis de los



ASUNTO: Informaciones referente a INGLATERRA.

1. Apreciación británica de las FF AA de ARGENTINA.

Ampliando lo informado en CFQ 1588-1 del 26Jun89, se remite la traducción de un artículo publicado en la revista británica JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLEY, del 21Ene89, por su correspondencia en BUENOS AIRES, JOE SHNEIDER.

En el mencionado artículo se especifica que "casi 90 generales se han retirado desde que el presidente RAUL ALFONSIN se hizo cargo en Dic 83".

Según un informe del CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS PARA LA NUEVA MAYORIA, 89 generales, 42 almirantes y 48 brigadieres dejaron el servicio activo en los últimos cinco años; cuando Alfonsín se hizo cargo, había 53 generales, 25 almirantes y 36 brigadieres, sin embargo 35 generales, 17 almirantes y 9 brigadieres, pasaron de inmediato a retiro.

Durante la administración de Alfonsín, 69 oficiales del Ejército fueron promovidos a general y 54 generales dejaron el arma; la Armada ha tenido 41 nuevos almirantes y perdió 25, y la Fuerza Aérea por su parte ha tenido 40 brigadieres ascendidos y 39 retirados.

El Ejército ha tenido un porcentaje de retiro de 18 generales al año, con un promedio de 7/12 meses en sus cargos. Esta cifra mensual muestra a 33 generales en actividad, 24 almirantes y 28 brigadieres.

El Centro ha producido un estudio que indica que los juicios de personal militar comprometido con los levantamientos de Abr 87 y Ene y Dic 88, ha reemplazado a aquellos acusados por violaciones a los DD HH, como fuente de inquietud militar.

En el tiempo de la rebelión de Semana Santa de 1987, alrededor de 4500 oficiales, suboficiales y personal de las Fuerzas de Seguridad, eran juzgados por abusos a los DD HH, el número bajó de 1.100, debido a la Ley de "Punto Final",

La ley de 1987 de "Obediencia Debida", bajó el número a alrededor de 100 y seguido al levantamiento de MONTE CASEROS, fue reducido a 20 oficiales retirados.

Origen: PP MM

Valorización: B - 2

Buenos Aires, 27 de junio de 1989.

EXPEDIENTE Nro.

1955

29 JUN 1989

PROCESO

PASA A

GB- MSLV

ASSERVIS

- APREC S/ FFAA COMPLETO AL


PARDE MARZO -


- BOTAS Y PARREMIAS AL

ITS S.T. BASE (COPIA P/

TERMINO

SUBRE II)





ol
ciot
-
kra
as

Int. N. 226
13.05.04